DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BLOGGERS ROUNDTABLE WITH COLONEL STEVEN MAINS, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED; AND MILTON HILEMAN, SENIOR MILITARY ANALYST, U.S. ARMY CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED VIA TELECONFERENCE FROM FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS TIME: 11:00 A.M. EDT DATE: THURSDAY, MAY 1, 2008

(Note: Please refer to www.dod.mil for more information.)

COL. MAINS: (In progress) -- looking at the distribution of casualties in-unit over time. And what we found was that there was a small but clear rise in the number of casualties early in a deployment, concentrated in -- the first hundred days of the deployment was the most dangerous part of the deployment.

And that, you know, shouldn't be a surprise. Everybody, I'm sure, in this audience has read or at least seen "Band of Brothers." And they talked about the fact that when they would get replacements in, they didn't talk to them for the first 30 days because they didn't know if they were going to stay around. And if they survived 30 days, those guys were probably going to, you know, make it all the way to the end of the war. So it's not a new phenomenon that, you know, we just figured out and nobody had ever seen before, but it was something that we could clearly show was the case in Iraq. And so it drove us to say, well, what do they know at day 250 that they really need to know during those first hundred days? And they probably know it by instinct on 250, so if you sat them down and asked them, you may not even be able to get the answer. I kind of liken it to, you know, Randy Moss. No matter what you might think of him, you know, phenomenal player, but if you asked him why he was such a phenomenal player, he may not be able to tell you all the things that he does that make him a great player.

But we did an extensive interviewing process where we sat guys down. We did a lot of historical research. And we interviewed about 1,700 -- a few more -- soldiers that -- and we asked them why they survived and were able to accomplish their mission in the first hundred days, and what did people do that was wrong in those first hundred days that might have resulted in casualties or mission failure. And they were very candid, very interesting comments. It just brought tears to your eyes to read the things that the soldiers told us about what they expect from their leaders and what they expect from themselves and other soldiers. Very candid. It was a great -- a great opportunity.

And so we started with the first hundred days. We were going to write one handbook for soldiers, and based on what they told us, it grew into another handbook for the junior leaders because the issues that -- the decisions junior leaders make clearly affect survivability and mission accomplishment. And of course, they're not used to making those decisions because they're new in theater as well. And then we wrote one for commanders and staffs, focused really on the staff processes at battalion and brigade level.

We published those three. They're huge sellers for us. Typically, we will publish, you know, kind of 20,000, maybe, you know, reprint a couple of times on a handbook. But the first hundred days soldiers, we know that it's well more than 200,000 are in print and we know that four countries are translating it for their own soldiers. And the other two handbooks are really close behind on that. So we're getting an awful lot of interest from the Army that they think this is a good product and something that's useful to them.

We're going to come out with one more, focused on transition teams. And there's a lot of things that are different that the transition team needs to do in the first hundred days -- maybe not quite as focused on going on patrol and staying alive as a junior soldier might be, but they need to come in quickly and gain rapport with their counterparts, the guy that they're advising. And it should not have to take 100 days to gain that rapport. They need to start at a very high level and set expectations, gain that kind of interpersonal relationship very quickly, because they're just their for a year.

So with that, maybe what we'll do is open to questions. You probably want to know, you know, some of the things that we put into the first hundred days, and probably the best guy to talk about it is Milt Hileman, who has been the lead analyst on the first three first hundred days and really deserves the lion's share of the credit for making these the success that they are. So, Milt, why don't I turn it over to you and you can talk a little bit about what we found in the first hundred days.

MR. HILEMAN: Good morning, everybody -- or in some cases it may be the afternoon.

But we started out this project, as Colonel Mains said, based on that kind of bubble we saw in the first three months of the deployment.

So we began with -- we wanted to find out from the soldiers that survived why they think they survived, what they thought the best techniques were. And we -- in all the responses and when we interviewed soldiers one on one, we asked them to respond back to us as if they were talking to a fellow soldier.

So I want to say up front, I think part of the great -- why the books are so successful and why they're so universally accepted out there is because we didn't write them as instruction manuals; we wrote them from the standpoint of one soldier talking to another soldier about, "Hey, you know, here's what you need to know when you get over there so you can get the mission done and reduce the risk to becoming a casualty." So that was kind of the approach we took to writing the books, and I think that's what's really made them successful.

Just in general terms, the things we learned, there was nothing that was -- nothing that surprised us overall. Soldiers basically said that if -- you know, if they're good soldiers that are well- trained with good leaders are going to survive on any battlefield, not just exclusively to OIF or OEF. And that was what the -- that was the first lesson they took back to us. Part of the good soldiering part goes to the business on staying alert, staying attuned to your environment. And the word we heard over and over again was "complacency."

And if there was anything that kind of caught us off guard, it was the business that soldiers said that complacency in one way or another contributed

to every casualty that they saw. And it was little things like not following SOPs, not having all your kit when you went out the gate on a mission, leaders not checking, leaders not doing their pre-combat inspections, leaders not being adaptive in the way they approached their mission, they way they planned it. And I'm talking down to the small unit level, little things about going out the gate and making a left turn every day and not saying, "Okay, today we're going to turn right." And it was little things like that that they kind of lumped under the umbrella of complacency. That -- I would say that was the first thing that we hadn't expected to see, but when we dug into it, we really understood what the soldiers were telling us.

Every soldier and even the small unit leaders -- I'm talking about, you know, G5s, G6s that were squad leaders, tank commanders -- expected good leadership. And when I say good leadership, I mean guys that are willing to get out there, they lead from the front. If they don't have tactical experience themselves, then they seek out the guys in their platoons and companies that have that experience and they avail themselves of the benefit of having those experienced soldiers with them. They certainly expected their leaders to share the same level of risk that they shared every day when they went out on a mission. And they didn't want leaders that were soft. They expected soldiers -- or expected their leaders to set standards and enforce the standards every day. And even if -- (laughs) -- you know, even if it kind of, you know, rubbed the soldiers the wrong way about why do I got to do this today, well, because they expect the leader to set that standard and say, "Because this is the standard."

There was a couple of other things. We talked to them initially about, you know, do you have enough equipment and the right equipment? And by and large, they all felt they did.

The other thing is we asked soldiers about, you know, did you get enough training? Was your unit ready to go to combat when you got over there? And in excess of 70 percent of the soldiers we talked to said, yeah, their unit was trained and ready to go. And that was another thing that we kind of took back as, you know, we're on the right track as an Army as far as getting our soldiers prepared.

I think all in all that was the big thing.

Oh, I was going to say one other thing on leadership. It shouldn't be any surprise to anybody that's familiar with the military or any hierarchical organization, but when soldiers identified that they had a weak leader, that guy stopped being leader. Now, he may still be a lieutenant or a sergeant in that leadership position, but they soon kind of learned -- you know, they set up an underground chain of command, and they would go to the guys that they felt confident in and trusted with their lives.

So one of the things we see in the handbooks to leaders, if you're a weak leader, you better recognize it right off and either take some steps to correct that or find something else to do, because the soldiers aren't going to -- the soldiers set up their own chain of command, and that chain of command will be the one that they have faith in that is going to look for their best interest every day when they go out on missions.

So that's a culminating thing that we -- I think every soldier kind of -- those of us if who've been soldiers kind of knew that existed, but they were

quick to codify that when they talked in terms of what they expected from their leadership.

With that, I'll open it up to any questions that you have for Colonel Mains or I.

MR. HOLT: Okay. Christian Lowe, you were first on line. Why don't you get us started.

Q Good morning, gentlemen. This is Christian Lowe with military.com.

Fist I have sort of a general question here. Why is this handbook not available to the public? And if it is, you know, is there any way we can link up to it? Because these are fascinating insights and I know our readers would be interested to know some of the specifics that you found.

And then a follow-up question is, you talk about general findings here. These are universal truths in the military: complacency, leadership, follow-through, varying your routes, that sort of thing. But what specifically to Iraq did you find in this? COL. MAINS: Let me address the first one. Most of what we do is for official use only. And so, I mean, certainly if you wanted to take a look at the handbook or, you know, maybe draw out a couple key lessons that your readers would be interested in, we can certainly do that. We're probably not comfortable hanging the whole handbook out. I mean, there's nothing secret, obviously, because it is unclassified/FOUO, but, you know, we do kind of want to keep that small layer of security by keeping it behind the firewall. But if there's some specific issue that you want to write about, we can certainly do that.

Q Well, just to -- how do we know what we'd like to know if we can't see it, if we have no idea? I mean, I remember when the Center for Army Lessons Learned, all of the publications were available to the public, and then after 9/11, that was shut down.

COL. MAINS: Yeah, right. No, we could certainly give you a copy of it with the caveat that if there was something that you wanted to quote out of it, you know, we'd just like to take a look at that before you -- you know, to kind of clear the quotation.

Q Okay. I'll come back to you through Jack here on that.

COL. MAINS: Yeah. But, you know, fair point, you can't write about it if you can't look at it.

Q Exactly.

COL. MAINS: And we'll certainly share that with you.

Q Okay. Thanks.

COL. MAINS: And that goes for all of the bloggers, with the same caveat; don't hang it on your site, please.

Q Okay. Appreciate it.

And so what about the Iraq -- the things specific to Iraq?

MR. HILEMAN: Yeah. This is Milt Hileman again. If there's anything in there that I would call Iraq specific, it was, of course, there was great discussion on IEDs as being the greatest killer even to date, and that's no surprise; although if you kind of scrape below the IED moniker, you're going to find out tat we're really talking about land mines and booby traps and things that the Army has always faced in warfare.

The other thing that obviously was the difference is in culture. And soldiers all expressed a desire to have some kind of cultural induction and background. And it needed to get beyond the -- we didn't need -- (inaudible) -- language training.

What I needed was, or what the soldiers especially needed was, how to interact with Iraqis every day, and just some basic terms: Hello; Goodday; How are you; Goodbye. You know, those kind of things that would help them interact with the citizens that they see every day on the street.

So if there's anything that I would, you know, kind of put in under the -- in the box of unique, it would be those two things.

Q Okay.

But just to quickly clarify, these handbooks are not necessarily Iraq-specific. They're --

MR. HILEMAN: Well, let me say that we wrote these with the intent of not limiting them to Iraq. So you know, 80 percent of what's in those handbooks, you could apply to any combat situation, to include Afghanistan. And we wrote the books with that intent.

Now, understand that the predominance of the audience that we talked to, to gather the information, was veterans of OIF.

COL. MAINS: You know, it goes back to -- the surprising finding that we had was that there was nothing surprising; that it was basic soldiering. And we've in fact sent these out to the drill sergeants, to IET training, to pass them out to the recruits as they're graduating from IET.

And really the point is that you didn't have to do all of those things to the standard, because your drill sergeant was just a tough guy or wanted to make it hard on you. You have to do all of those things, because that's what's going to keep you alive and that's what's going to help you accomplish your mission. And it comes down to basic discipline and soldiering.

Q Okay, great. Thanks, guys.

MR. HOLT: Okay. And Jarred.

Q Yes, sir. Thank you for your time.

Could you talk a little bit about -- I know that those have different volumes coming out. And now that we're kind of moving into more of the counterinsugency clear, hold, build, as opposed to kinetic operations, how has the focused changed on what the mission used to be in the first hundred days?

COL. MAINS: Well, I mean, firstly we are coming out with one specifically tailored to the Military Transition Teams, the MiTTs. And you know, I kind of use MiTT as an umbrella for all of the various kinds of ETTs, OMLTs, you know, NPTTs, all of those.

You know, that's that whole group of advisers. They'll be covered by this. And so, you know, certainly we're pushing for that.

I think when you look at the handbook, the handbooks themselves, you'll see that it isn't just kinetic skills; that it talks a lot about engaging the environment, understanding the environment, understanding when the environment changes.

You know, the classic is, when the marketplace goes dark and quiet in the middle of a busy day, something bad is about to happen. And somebody knows it, and maybe not you.

But, so you know, those sorts of things, of kind of relating to the environment and relating to the population, using the population to help you find the enemy, is something that we do talk about.

MR. HILEMAN: This is Milt Hileman.

You know, we talk a lot, the Three Block War. Certainly the soldiers and leaders that we talk to were experiencing that as part of their time over there. So there's very much a flavor of COIN that kind of interweaves the handbooks. So I would not say that, you know, that the books are no longer perfect, now that we're in more of a reconstruction and support type versus a, you know, straight combat.

Because at the time we talked to these guys, every one of the soldiers said, you know, they may be out on patrol looking for -- (inaudible) -- one day and out doing a MEDCAP which is a, you know, we take medics out to treat the local population, or handing out schools supplies. Or they may be doing both in the same day. So that kind of experience is embedded in the handbooks.

MR. HOLT: Okay.

Andrea.

Q Gentlemen, I was just wondering if you guys could perhaps comment on some of the transition teams' specific challenges you noted. And I was wondering if you'd explained, in any portion of -- (inaudible) -- how U.S. battalion and brigade commanders should interact with the transition teams.

COL. MAINS: Yeah, we -- you know, they really -- they face a couple of challenges, the transition teams: number one, that the transition team members and their transition team leader may or may not have a lot of combat experience. Sometimes they will, but you know, sometimes it'll be his first tour, or it could be his first tour in that theater, and all his experience is in another one.

But he's going to come in, and he's going to advise a brigade or a division commander who may have quite a bit of combat experience. It may be against the Iranians or it may be, you know, something in a less formal environment in Afghanistan. But he's still got to come in with the knowledge that he has, but also understanding that he doesn't have all the knowledge in

the world. Going to (CJFC ?), however good that is, and it is, is -- you know, is only one part of the equation.

So a transition team leader has got to come in open to the officer that he's advising, but still kind of bring his knowledge to bear as well. And so, you know, it comes back to understanding the culture, understanding the person that you're dealing with, and gaining that interpersonal relationship.

And that's the thing that we are trying to stress in the transition team handbook, so that -- you know, it goes a lot farther. We talk about cultural awareness, and it goes a lot farther than, you know, don't wave with your left hand and don't show the balls of your feet to an Arab. You know, those are the sorts of things that, you know, okay, that's a nice start, but you know, what do you do that really is going to ingratiate yourself -- ingratiate you with your counterpart and get him to start listening to what you have to say, and where do you draw the line? At some point, you just have to say to your -- the officer that you're advising, you know, this has just got to happen, you have got to make this happen. You know, when does it get to that point, because, you know, certainly you can only do that a limited number of times.

We do try to talk about battalion brigade commanders, how they should be dealing with their Iraqi or Afghani counterparts, because they need to understand how to use the transition team. You know, that transition team is not the commander of the unit, and it is not the liaison officer for the unit. Our battalion and brigade commanders have got to deal commander to commander with their Iraqi counterparts. Otherwise, there is not going to be a command relationship there at all. And so they don't want to put the transition team in as a buffer between the blue unit and the Iraqi unit. They want to use that team and leverage them appropriately, and go commander to commander as much as possible.

MR. HOLT: No. All right. And somebody else joined us. Who's on line there?

Q Yes, I did. Jack, Andrew.

MR. HOLT: Okay, Andrew. Go ahead.

Q Gentlemen, Andrew Lubin from The Military Observer. How are you this afternoon?

MR./COL. : Great. Good to talk to you.

Q Two things. Gentlemen, two questions that are kind of a follow-up to Christian's question. A lot of these findings you spoke about earlier -- great leadership, great training, you know, and how the enlisted men kind of tune out the officer; you want good -- these -- none of this is new. This goes back to World War II or earlier. Is any of this a surprise to people reading the book? I mean, it shouldn't be.

And the follow-up to this is that the Army is now taking an increasing amount of people, as we've heard in the last couple of months, with felonies, and the waiver problems have increased.

Are these the kids who are coming over unprepared, or can you kind of address that in the same subject?

MR. HILEMAN: Milt Hileman here. I can't speak for, you know, if the kids are coming over prepared, but the point I was trying to make -- and as you say, it's universal. It transcends more than the current conflict we're in. Soldiers felt that they had -- you know, they -- I guess if anything, if I were to tell soldiers, you know, as we started out saying about, you know, it starts with basic training, just pay attention to the training that the Army is giving you, because we're not giving it to you just to be hard on you or because we've got to fill the time. We're giving it to you because it's going to save your life.

And soldiers told us that, yep, every bit of, you know, the training -- when I paid attention and the training I got, I was able to apply and it has a real-world application. And as you say, that's -- that is a universal axiom among soldiers from the time we kind of picked up our first implement and started waging war.

COL. MAINS: You know, that point on the complacency is something that, when you kind of break it down, you say, you know, that's something that we've known all along as well, where if you go back to the Ranger handbook, you know, the 1980 version that I used in Ranger school, you know, it says never come back on the same route that you go out on. You know, those sorts of things are the complacency that soldiers talked about.

They talked a lot, too, about the kind of psychological dimensions of warfare, something that probably, particularly in peacetime before the current conflict, we didn't place enough -- enough emphasis in training on. You know, for instance, you know, it's hard for us to think, well, you'd become complacent when you're in a combat zone, but you can. And fatigue can cause that, fear can cause that, just the daily routine can cause that.

So the soldiers said, you know, it's all of the above, and leaders have to take active steps in order to combat that. Moving guys from one position to another. You know, you'd like everybody to be an absolute expert on the position that they are filling, but if the guy has done that 365 days in a row, he is going to become complacent when he's doing it.

And so you have to train your folks to be interchangeable and move them around to make them think about the position that they're in today. Soldiers have to check each other and leaders have to check them because -- just because you took the aid bag out yesterday on patrol and you didn't use it doesn't mean that you don't check it today, because the day you don't check it is the day you're going to need it.

MR. HILEMAN: Let me -- I'm sorry, let me add one more thing to that. One of the things we're trying to do with these handbooks, and particularly in the soldier's handbook, is to let -- is to get the soldier to understand that he's going to experience those kind of feelings. He's going to be tired, he's going to be mentally drawn, just the stress of day-to-day patrolling.

So one of the things that we've put in the handbook is, number one is you've got to recognize that hey, those are -- it's okay to go through that because that's part of the stress of combat. And in the soldier's handbook, we added a little part of some tools that they can use in dealing with the stress, and particularly with the first they experience casualties, they're going to have all kinds of emotional things. And one of the things that we tell the soldier right off is, hey, that's natural, it's okay to feel that way, but recognize it, be able to deal with it personally and as a small unit, and then

that will allow you to kind of get over it and go back to -- you know, you can focus on a mission the next day.

So we put those kinds of things in there for the individual soldier. And when I say individual soldier, you know, it could easily be a lieutenant who's leading his platoon in combat for the first time. So we try to put those kind of tools in there to help an individual deal with the personal challenges of combat and still be able to soldier on the next day.

COL. MAINS: Let me give you an example from the leaders handbook that, you know, we really never talked about in training that I've been in, anyway, and it's kind of unique to this experience, that a lieutenant, just by definition, unless he's prior service, but the vast majority of lieutenants, when they go to Iraq or Afghanistan, it is their first tour, whereas the sergeants and the soldiers that they're leading may have several tours under their belt. So the leadership experience in that situation is much different than it was when, you know, guys jumped into Panama, where everybody it was their first experience.

And so how does the leader capitalize on the experience that his guys have but still remains the leader? I mean, he can't just say, "Well, you know how to do this because you've been here before; okay, I'm going to hand things over to you, Sergeant," because he's still responsible. He's still the lieutenant. He's still the platoon leader. And the NCOs, the privates, expect the leader to ask their opinion, but when it comes down to time to make the decision, it may be the decision's got to be made very quickly, they expect the leader to lead.

So, you know, if he's got the time, if he can draw on that experience, particularly in training, great, they expect that to be done because they have experience and they've got a viewpoint on how things should be done, but in the end they want the leader to lead and they want him to make the decisions, take the risks that they face, and move out.

COL. MAINS: Understand we mean "him or her."

MR. HILEMAN: Yeah.

Q Okay, great. Thank you.

MR. HOLT: All right. Anybody else?

Q Yeah, Greg Grant here, Government Executive. Hey, you know, I was curious what you've learned about tour length, combat tour length. You know, having spent some time over there embedded with the soldiers, they say they're kind of clueless the first few months until they learn their AO, and then they really start cruising around month eight or nine. I'm just wondering what you guys thought -- what you've learned about the year-long tour length. It's kind of interesting that we've gone back to a year-long tour length after the controversy from Vietnam about a one-year combat tour. I just wondered what thoughts you might have on that.

MR. HILEMAN: This is Milt Hileman here. Honestly, that was one of the areas we just didn't ask. Of course, the soldiers we all talked to were about on a 12-month rotation. That was before the surge and everything. And that was just not an area that we got into. We really focused on surviving those first 90 days or first 100 days, and so we didn't get into -- that was the time period we

kind of limited our questions to and asked them to focus their answers on. So we really didn't get into the longer tours and the impact of that.

COL. MAINS: Now, the point that you bring up, Greg, is very good, that you talk to units that say that they really start cruising after they've been there a couple of months. That's exactly why we wrote these handbooks. And we've seen that in other collections. We went and talked to JTF-82 in Afghanistan, and they talk about the same thing. And so we tried to capture from them what they wished they had done ahead of time to kind of get ready and maybe shorten that acclimation period. But that is really what we are all about in the Center for Army Lessons Learned, and particularly with the first hundred days project, is get them operating in the first hundred days the way they would be operating in the last hundred days.

Q You know, I was just curious because, you know, SF has a different kind of rotation model, and obviously the Marines have a shorter, six-month period. And I just wondered if as an army, as an institution of learning army lessons, if you've kind of examined what might be a better mix going forward as we kind of settle into these longer, protracted conflicts. (Pause.) Hello?

MR. MAINS: Yeah, we were just having a quick sidebar.

We really don't have any data to say, you know, a longer tour is better, a shorter tour is better. Of course, you know, when you get into the 15-month tours, you've got a fatigue factor that's increased. If you have a shorter tour, you know, you mitigate that fatigue factor, but then you've got, you know, kind of an increased learning curve. You know, if we were rotating every six or eight months, then we'd be going through that learning curve more often. But no, we have not done any kind of a study to say what the optimal tour length should be.

Q Got you. Let me ask just one quick follow-up. Obviously, the Army's got a tremendous counterinsurgency experience that's building up right now. Do you have any concern that's been voiced by some leaders in the Army that if all of a sudden you had to switch on and the soldiers had to put their artillery hat back on or their tank commander hat back on, they'd be able to execute some pretty high- intensity maneuver-type operations?

MR. MAINS: I would say that that is a concern. And there have been a lot of studies done, a lot of discussion at higher levels in the Army, and something that, you know, frankly, we just have to make a plan. TRADOC, as the Training and Doctrine Command, you know, probably has the responsibility to address that. And there's lot of ways to do it. You know, teams that would go out and retrain units.

But yes, there's a lot of experience that folks have because they grew up, you know, operating on the gun line, going out to be a fit (ph) chief, coming back to the gun line, you know, that sort of thing, that cycle that when they get to be senior leaders, then gives them an understanding that they might not necessarily have if they just learn about it from a textbook or on a short training exercise.

So it's certainly an issue that the Army is thinking very hard about.

Q Thanks.

MR. HOLT: All right. Any follow-up questions? Anybody else out there that I missed?

Q Jack, I have a quick follow-up. Christian Lowe, military.com.

Folks, you mentioned early on that you had done statistical analysis of casualties in Iraq. I assume you were talking about the current conflict zones. And it showed that the first hundred days, those casualties were higher. Have you gone -- since this handbook, especially the soldier's handbook, has been out for over a year, have you gone back and sort of looked to see if there was a real, statistical, tangible impact of this manual in the field?

MR. HILEMAN: Milt Hileman, again. We haven't -- at CALL we haven't done anything directly to go back and gather that kind of data. The data that we began the project with actually came from an agency outside CALL, which I will -- I'm not going to mention the name of it right now, and because part of it was based on a classified response.

I will tell you, though, that given the response to the handbooks and the popularity, at least from the number that we are issuing soldiers in the field and the lessons that they would apply from the handbooks, we would expect to see some mitigation of that casualty rate in the first 90 days. I certainly, being a member of CALL, I would -- you know, our goal hear at CALL is to mitigate casualties not just through our hundred-day handbooks but through every publication that we issue the soldiers in the field. The intent is -- is to give the soldier the tools to do the job and survive and come back at the end of the mission and when we finally conclude, you know, the conflict, combat operations. That the goal of everybody here at CALL. And so, you know, we kind of work every day with the hope that we can help a soldier get his mission done and get back home safely.

Q Okay, thanks.

MR. HOLT: Okay. Anything else? Any other follow-ups? (No response.) Okay.

Well, colonel, Milt, have you got any final thoughts, final closing comments for us?

COL. MAINS: NO. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you all. If we can just get the addresses from Jack, we'll go ahead and send out the three volumes of the four-volume set, but just with the caveat that we discussed at the beginning.

Please don't hang it on your site, and if you want to quote from it, you know, please give us the opportunity to say yeah, that's okay, or you know, leave this part out, please. But nothing is classified; it's just a matter of sensitivity.

MR. HOLT: All right, sir. Thank you very much, and yes, I will gather that information up, sir, and get that to you. And thank you very much for joining us, and we look forward to see you coming back and speaking with us again here on the Bloggers Roundtable.

COL. MAINS: All right. Great. Thank you for the opportunity. Good to talk to you all.

MR. HOLT: All right. Thank you, sir.

MR. HILEMAN: Thanks.

Q Thanks.

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